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The	regulation	of	unfair	trading	practices	after	Brexit
The	effect	of	Brexit	on	unfair	trading	practices	(UTPs)	has	been	largely	overlooked,	yet	it	could	be
very	significant	–	especially	in	agriculture.	Tom	Verdonk	(KU	Leuven)	looks	at	whether	the
regulations	could	diverge	and	what	impact	that	would	have.
With	the	UK’s	imminent	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	the	EU’s	motto	“United	in	diversity”	has	clearly
taken	a	hit.	While	the	motto	is	generally	used	to	refer	to	European	cultural	diversity,	it	could	equally
apply	to	some	legal	domains.	One	legal	area	in	which	EU	Member	States	have	shown	to	be	united
in	diversity	is	the	domain	of	so-called	laws	on	unfair	trading	practices	between	businesses	(UTPs),	which	refers	to	a
wide	variety	of	business-to-business	practices	that	deviate	from	good	commercial	conduct	and	are	contrary	to	good
faith	and	fair	dealing.
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UTPs	tend	to	occur	in	vertical	relationships	(i.e.	between	a	supplier	and	a	buyer)	characterised	by	an	inequality	of
bargaining	power.	Similar	to	abuses	of	dominance,	UTPs	are	often	imposed	unilaterally	by	a	larger	undertaking	on	a
smaller	one,	though	a	firm	does	not	have	to	be	dominant	in	the	competition	law	sense.	The	asymmetrical	relationship
between	two	undertakings	itself	is	seen	as	a	facilitator	for	the	imposition	of	harmful	practices	at	the	expense	of	the
smaller	firm.
Consequently,	almost	all	Member	States	have	taken	legislative	and/or	regulatory	initiatives	addressing	UTPs.
Without	rules	to	tackle	UTPs,	they	fear	UTPs	will	impede	the	functioning	of	markets,	as	they	can	result	in	the
misallocation	of	resources	and	(disproportional)	exclusionary	and	exploitative	conduct,	at	the	expense	of	SMEs	and,
ultimately,	consumers.	But	approaches	of	Member	States	are	far	from	uniform.	The	beginning	of	the	end	of	this
divergence	may,	however,	soon	commence,	as	the	Commission	recently	proposed	legislation	in	this	area.
Interestingly,	the	UK	Government	was	for	a	long	time	one	of	the	Commission’s	main	critics,	arguing	against	any
attempt	to	harmonise	rules	on	UTPs.	Among	other	reasons,	it	did	not	recognize	the	added	value	of	EU	rules	on	top
of	its	own	system.
Compared	to	other	fields	of	law	that	deal	with	the	protection	of	markets	and	their	participants,	the	impact	of	Brexit	on
the	regulation	of	UTPs	has	been	virtually	overlooked,	arguably	due	to	the	absence	of	common	rules	on	UTPs	(as	of
yet).	Nevertheless,	this	field	should	not	be	ignored,	as	the	sector-specific	scope	of	the	draft	EU	legislation	on	UTPs
could	have	profound	effects	on	some	important	UK	and	EU	markets	in	the	post-Brexit	era.	Therefore,	this	article
explores	the	development	of	regulation	of	UTPs	in	the	EU	and	the	UK,	highlights	interesting	elements	from	these
systems,	and	shares	some	thoughts	on	how	Brexit	may	impact	the	future	development	of	this	legal	domain.
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Developments	in	the	European	Union
Apart	from	the	Late	Payments	Directive	and	the	Directive	on	misleading	and	comparative	advertising,	there	are	no
EU	rules	on	UTPs	between	businesses.	The	lack	of	common	rules	is	surprising	in	itself,	because	EU	law	has	a
prominent,	if	not	leading,	role	in	many	adjacent	areas	of	law	and	policy,	such	as	competition	law,	consumer	law,	and
agricultural	policy.	Despite	the	absence	of	common	rules	on	UTPs,	almost	all	Member	States	have	implemented
laws,	regulations	and	administrative	provisions	to	specifically	address	UTPs.	General	(contract)	law	is	not	seen	as	an
adequate	solution,	since	smaller	parties	like	SMEs	may	be	reluctant	in	seeking	redress	before	civil	courts	for	fear	of
retaliations	(known	as	the	“fear	factor”).
Approaches	of	Member	States	come	in	all	shapes	and	forms,	but	can	essentially	be	divided	into	two	groups.	In	the
first	group	Member	States	have	stretched	the	scope	of	competition	law	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	abuse	of
dominance	prohibition,	as	laid	down	in	Article	102	TFEU.	As	Member	States	are	not	precluded	under	Regulation
1/2003	from	implementing	stricter	national	competition	laws	with	regard	to	abuses	of	dominance,	some	have
introduced	the	concepts	of	abuses	of	superior	bargaining	power	or	economic	dependence
(e.g.	France	and	Germany).	In	the	second	group	(representing	the	vast	majority	of	Member	States),	on	the	other
hand,	Member	States	have	chosen	to	implement	legislation	outside	the	scope	of	competition	law.	These	rules	aim	to
govern	contractual	relations	between	suppliers	and	buyers,	sometimes	specifically	addressing	the	food	supply	chain.
Typically,	rules	on	UTPs	in	the	area	of	business-to-consumer	protection	have	been	extended	to	business-to-business
transactions.	In	addition	to	the	above	approaches,	many	self-regulatory	mechanisms,	again	often	with	a	focus	on	the
food	supply	chain,	have	been	launched,	such	as	the	EU-wide	Supply	Chain	Initiative.
In	response	to	the	fragmentation	within	the	EU	in	the	regulation	of	UTPs	and	in	contract	law	in	general,
harmonisation	attempts	have	been	made	but	have	also	proven	to	be	very	difficult.	An	exemplary	project	from	recent
times	in	that	regard	was	the	rejected	Common	European	Sales	Law,	which	aimed	to	introduce	a	single	set	of
contract	law	rules	that	would	stand	as	an	alternative	to	national	contract	law	of	Member	States	in	both	business-to-
consumer	and	business-to-business	transactions.
However,	recent	initiatives	could	turn	the	tide.	In	April	2018	the	European	Commission	proposed	two	pieces	of
legislation	that	aim	to	tackle	UTPs	between	businesses:	a	proposal	against	UTPs	in	the	food	supply	chain	and
a	regulation	to	ensure	fairness	of	platform-to-business	trading	practices	in	the	online	platform	economy.	Particularly,
the	first	initiative	sparked	discussion,	because	it	would	–	if	adopted	–	introduce	a	minimum	level	of	protection	for
suppliers	active	in	the	food	supply	chain	against	UTPs	of	buyers	across	the	EU,	prohibit	a	number	of	UTPs	(of	which
some,	only	if	not	agreed	in	clear	and	unambiguous	terms),	and	have	each	Member	State	designate	a	competent
enforcement	authority	with	the	power	to	apply	fines.
Another	interesting	aspect	of	the	proposal	is	its	legal	basis,	which	was	found	in	one	of	the	key	objectives	of	the	EU’s
Common	Agricultural	Policy	(i.e.	“to	ensure	a	fair	standard	of	living	for	the	agricultural	community”).	As	a	result,
agricultural	policy	and	EU	regulation	of	UTPs	have	become	closely	intertwined.	Currently,	both	proposals	have	been
submitted	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council,	and	are	still	under	debate.	If	adopted,	they	would	introduce
EU	rules	on	UTPs,	albeit	with	a	sector-specific	and	limited	substantive	scope.
Developments	in	the	United	Kingdom
Within	the	debate	on	EU	rules	on	UTPs,	the	UK	Government	has	always	been	a	fierce	opponent	of	any	European
intervention.	Some	of	its	reasons	against	harmonisation	were	of	a	more	general	nature	and	included	its	scepticism
towards	the	incorporation	of	concepts	like	“good	faith”	and	“fair	dealing”	into	the	UK’s	common	law	system	(and	the
legal	uncertainty	they,	accordingly,	could	create	within	the	system),	the	inadequacy	of	contract	law	in	dealing	with
abuses	of	economic	dependence,	and	the	risks	associated	with	interfering	in	the	business-to-business	freedom	of
contracts,	particularly	the	increased	likelihood	of	overprotection.	Based	on	these	arguments,	the	UK	Government
expressed	its	support	for	a	sector-by-sector	approach	through	national	initiatives.	That	way,	certain	market	failures
could	be	targeted	specifically,	allowing	interventions	to	be	beneficial	or	at	least	neutral	in	their	impact,	in	both	the
short	and	long	term.
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Despite	its	sector-specific	focus	and	minimum	harmonisation	character,	the	UK	Government	also
expressed	concerns	over	the	Commission’s	draft	Directive	on	UTPs	in	the	food	supply	chain.	Its	main	concerns	were
the	lack	of	flexibility	for	Member	States	and	the	costs	of	the	increased	remit	of	a	regulatory	authority.	Instead	of
harmonising	the	rules	on	UTPs,	the	UK	Government	considered	Member	States	themselves	to	be	in	the	most
appropriate	position	to	legislate.	This	allows	them	to	take	into	account	the	specific,	domestic	market	conditions,	as
the	UK	does,	according	to	the	Minister	for	Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Food,	within	its	already	existing	system
addressing	UTPs.
Currently,	the	UK	does	not	have	general	(statutory)	rules	on	UTPs,	but	it	does	have	a	system	to	tackle	UTPs	in	the
UK	groceries	supply	chain.	The	Groceries	Code	Adjudicator	(GCA)	monitors	and	enforces	compliance	with
the	Groceries	Supply	Code	of	Practice	(GSCOP),	which	aims	to	ensure	fair	and	lawful	treatment	of	direct	suppliers
by	the	UK’s	ten	largest	supermarkets.	The	GSCOP	applies	only	to	supermarkets	with	a	turnover	in	sales	of	groceries
in	the	UK	exceeding	£1billion,	which	currently	are:	Aldi,	Asda,	Co-operative,	Iceland,	Lidl,	Marks	&	Spencer,
Morrisons,	Sainsbury’s,	Tesco,	and	Waitrose.	Under	the	GSCOP	these	supermarkets	must	comply	with	a	variety	of
obligations	when	dealing	with	their	suppliers,	including	the	use	of	written	contracts,	and	refrainment	from
retrospective	supply	arrangements	and	pay	delays.	If	a	supermarket	does	not	comply	with	the	GSCOP,	a	supplier	is
able	to	involve	the	GCA.	The	GCA	then	has	the	power	to	arbitrate,	investigate	and	fine	a	supermarket.	In	February	of
this	year,	the	UK	Government	decided	not	to	extend	the	remit	of	the	GCA	following	a	consultation.	Although
the	consultation	identified	UTPs	in	the	UK	groceries	supply	chain,	the	Government	concluded	that	“there	is	no	clear
evidence	of	systematic	widespread	market	failures.”
Similar	to	the	EU,	regulation	of	UTPs	in	the	UK	cannot	be	considered	in	isolation	from	agricultural	policy.	While	UK’s
withdrawal	from	the	EU	will	also	place	it	outside	the	CAP,	a	link	between	UK	agricultural	policy	and	regulation	of
UTPs	will	probably	continue	to	exist.	A	new	Agriculture	Bill	was	introduced	by	the	Government	into	Parliament	in
September	of	this	year.	Among	other	provisions,	the	draft	bill	includes	a	provision	that	gives	the	Government	the
power	to	make	regulations	“for	the	purpose	of	promoting	fair	contractual	dealing	by	the	first	purchasers	of	agricultural
products	(…)	in	relation	to	contracts	they	make	for	the	purchase	of	agricultural	products	from	producers.”
Post-Brexit	prospects
Brexit	may	serve	as	turning	point	for	EU	regulation	of	UTPs,	as	proponents	of	harmonisation	of	laws	on	UTPs	lose	a
critical	Member	State.	To	a	great	extent,	this	will	also	depend	on	the	success	of	the	proposed	Directive	on	UTPs	in
the	food	supply	chain.	If	adopted	and	positively	evaluated	in	the	(near)	future,	the	Directive	could	reinvigorate	calls
for	further	integration	and	perhaps	even	for	general	EU	laws	on	UTPs	between	businesses,	similar	to	the	provisions
and	instruments	of	EU	consumer	and	competition	law.	Ironically,	despite	its	opposition	against	EU	laws	on	UTPs,	the
UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU	will	not	provide	its	government	an	opportunity	to	shirk	from	participating	in	debates	on
the	desirability	of	laws	on	UTPs.	In	fact,	despite	Brexit,	laws	on	UTPs	could	affect	the	UK	in	a	number	of	ways.
Firstly,	following	Brexit,	UK-based	businesses	conducting	business	with	EU-based	businesses	would	still	have	to
comply	with	the	applicable	laws	on	UTPs	in	Member	States	in	some	cases.	If	the	draft	EU	legislation	were	to	be
adopted,	UK-based	buyers	active	in	the	food	supply	chain	buying	from	EU-based	suppliers	would	have	to	comply
with	the	implemented	obligations	of	the	draft	Directive,	and	UK-based	digital	firms	targeting	the	EU	market	would
have	to	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	draft	Regulation.	Given	the	great	uncertainty	regarding	the	Brexit	scenario(s),	it
is	difficult	to	assess	how	Brexit	could	impact	laws	on	UTPs	during	the	transition	period.	According	to	the	current	draft
EU27/UK	Withdrawal	Agreement,	the	UK	would	remain	bound	by	all	existing	and	new	EU	regulations	throughout	a
transition	period,	which	is	currently	scheduled	to	end	on	31	December	2020.	Hence,	if	the	Directive	and/or	the
Regulation	were	to	be	adopted	before	or	during	the	transition	period,	the	UK	would	still	be	bound	by	the	adopted
legislation	on	UTPs	for	a	while.	Accordingly,	on	the	basis	of	that	scenario	it	is	unlikely	that	divergence	in	laws	on
UTPs	between	the	UK	and	the	EU27	will	arise	in	the	short	term.
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However,	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	regulation	of	UTPs	in	the	long	term	is	less	straightforward.	Divergence	in	legislation
could	eventually	arise	if	the	EU27	would	decide	to	further	integrate	laws	on	UTPs.	If	the	laws	on	UTPs	were	to	be
adopted	and	positively	evaluated	a	few	years	after	implementation,	this	could	pave	the	way	for	the	expansion	of	the
scope	of	the	rules	or	the	introduction	of	similar	rules	in	other	supply	chains.	In	those	instances,	it	remains	to	be	seen
whether	the	UK	will	follow	suit.	Also,	the	UK	itself	may	decide	to	diverge	from	the	EU’s	approach	to	UTPs,	because
Brexit	provides	the	UK	an	opportunity	to	tailor	its	legislation	and	regulation	to	the	specific	conditions	of	its	domestic
markets,	such	as	the	agricultural	market.	Given	the	close	relationship	between	regulation	of	UTPs	and	agricultural
policy,	divergence	between	EU	and	UK	agricultural	policies	may	play	a	significant	role	in	this	as	well.
On	the	other	hand,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	EU27	will	actually	continue	to	harmonise	rules	on	UTPs.	The
path	that	eventually	led	to	the	draft	Directive	was	scattered	with	obstacles,	hardly	surprising	after	various	failed
attempts	to	harmonise	European	private	law.	Reaching	consensus	on	the	way	forward	will	–	without	the	UK	–	not	be
a	walk	in	the	park	all	of	a	sudden	for	the	remaining	Member	States.	Furthermore,	in	response	to	the	undesirability	of
any	divergence	between	the	UK’s	and	EU’s	approach	to	UTPs,	(some)	convergence	or	coordination	may	be	deemed
necessary.	The	desirability	of	cooperation	in	this	area	may	specifically	be	relevant	in	the	agricultural	sector,	given	the
significant	cross-border	agricultural	trade	between	the	UK	and	some	Member	States	of	the	EU27.	After	all,	the	UK	is
currently	far	from	self-sufficient	in	agricultural	production	and	the	EU	is	the	UK’s	single	largest	trading	partner	in	agri-
food	products,	accounting	for	60%	of	exports	and	70%	of	imports,	as	also	recognised	in	a	House	of	Commons
report	on	Brexit	and	its	impact	on	the	UK’s	food	and	farming	industry.
Either	way,	it	is	clear	to	parties	on	both	sides	of	the	Channel	and	the	North	Sea	that	discussions	on	UTPs	legislation
are	not	done	yet.	In	the	EU,	current	discussions	on	the	draft	UTPs	legislation	in	the	European	Parliament	and	the
Council	reveal	that	there	seems	to	be	general	support	for	the	draft	Directive	(though	some	call	for	an	extension	of	its
scope).	Similarly,	the	consultation	on	the	GCA	and	the	new	Agriculture	Bill	indicate	strong	support	for	extension	of
rules	on	UTPs	in	the	UK	from	a	variety	of	stakeholders,	including	agricultural	trade	associations.	Therefore,	it	is	more
likely	than	not	that	following	Brexit	debates	on	the	desirability	and	scope	of	laws	on	UTPs	will	remain	on	the	political
agendas	of	the	UK	and	the	EU27.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
European	Futures.
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research	focuses	on	the	economic	regulation	of	agricultural	inputs	markets,	taking	into	account	competition	laws,
intellectual	property	and	agricultural	policy.
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